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Abstract 
 
The argument of this paper proceeds in four steps. In the first part it recapitulates that 
representation is a multifaceted concept, closely related to issues of accountability and 
responsiveness, which does not lend itself easily to develop practical rules for appropriately 
and directly representing EU citizens. A second part deals with the problem that democracy has 
not been a legal or normative concept which determined the early stages of European 
integration. However, since the signing of the Maastricht treaty we have witnessed a series of 
genuine attempts to go beyond regulatory matters and to create a political system with 
democratic credentials, protection of individual rights and means of political participation. 
Some of these have taken the shape of constitutional reform, not always successful, others came 
in the guise of more modest steps of institutional change. Thirdly, the impact of such practical 
reforms is demonstrated, especially the design of electoral rules and related aspects of the 
construction of a transnational political community. A final section addresses the thorny 
question whether the European Union should become a more politicized system, providing an 
assessment of the virtues and possible pitfalls of politicization. 
 
                                                   
*  This paper was written in a personal capacity and engages neither the European Parliament nor the EUI. 
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If we inquire historically into the causes that are likely to transform 
the engagés into the enragés, it is not injustice that ranks first but hypocrisy. 
Hannah Arendt 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, after a decade of noisy ups and 
downs in both the drafting and the ratification of the document, was almost completely 
eclipsed by the near high-water mark of the banking and Euro crises. Many actors, national 
political leaders as well as MEPs, Commissioners and eurocrats, had fought institutional and 
popular resistance to arrive at a further important step of constitutional reform. The event was 
thus perceived as both an anti-climax and an evolving opportunity to display the new 
instruments at work in response to a huge economic challenge. Unfortunately, although the 
Lisbon Treaty brought many fascinating institutional reforms, such as a legally binding Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, the extension of “co-decision” (now the ordinary legislative procedure) 
to agriculture and home affairs, or the creation of the European External Action Service, 
significant changes in macroeconomic governance and financial regulation were not among 
them. 
 
This explains why only months after Lisbon came into force there was talk of another treaty 
modification. Before, a rather widespread constitutional fatigue had led most actors to hope for 
an extended period of stability and consolidation. The change that will probably come about in 
the course of this year is limited to Article 136, to enable the establishment of a durable 
mechanism to come to the succour of Euro countries in budgetary difficulties or having an 
unsustainable level of sovereign debt. However, the conditionalities which will seemingly be 
attached to any future help programs in a legally binding way are revolutionary. They will 
apparently give other EU member states, if not the central Brussels institutions, the wherewithal 
collectively to get influence on hugely important policies in states requesting financial help 
from the EU: the age from which it will be possible to take retirement, wage indexation and 
wage bargaining structures, harmonisation of taxation and public expenditure and some more 
(Bohle 2010, Eichengreen 2011). 
 
One important claim of the liberal intergovernmentalist account of the evolution of the EU has 
been that there really is no “democratic deficit” in the way the European Union works 
(Moravcsik 2002). This is because European legislation (notably in its regulatory variety, see 
Majone 2006, among many others) focuses on policies where popular participation and accord 
are unnecessary because individuals’ lives are only marginally touched.1 Obviously, parameters 
like the retirement age or new regimes of wage negotiations present some direct interest for 
citizens, at least for those who depend on salaries and pensions. So are we coming to a situation 
                                                   
1  It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the related intergovernmentalist and “new modes of 
governance” claim that increasing the independence of expert actors and institutions from electoral 
politics and decision-making based on majorities enhances their capacity to deliver public goods and 
increase common welfare in the log-term because of less self-interested interference and rent-seeking. 
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where the endlessly debated democratic deficit (Marquand 1979) gets real? And what does this 
mean for the future of European democracy? The mantra justifying the three last treaty reforms 
was to obtain more transparency, efficiency and legitimacy for European governance. The 
number of European Parliament resolutions maintaining and reiterating these goals must go 
into the hundreds.2 The intention to “democratize” the Union was perhaps expressed with 
some more caution because of the thorny question of whether or not true democracy was 
limited to the nation-state. Still, for many the triad of more transparency, efficiency and 
legitimacy meant almost the same thing and, often enough, scholars and politicians do not shy 
away from demanding more European democracy (Schmitter 2000). 
 
Democracy is of course unthinkable without elections and political parties. This is not only the 
impression one gets from public discourse but also an essential claim of democratic theory since 
the 1950s.3 However, until quite recently scholarly and political debate about European 
democracy have curiously underplayed the importance of these institutions at the European 
level. Although for many years the reflexive response to a diagnosis of “democratic deficit” was 
a call to increase the powers of the European Parliament, much less thought was given to the 
up-stream aspects of how MEPs are elected. Moreover, any extension of Parliament’s powers 
would necessarily be limited by the legal powers expressly conferred on the Union by its 
member states. This constraint was rarely given attention in the European democracy debate. 
Counter-factually, Moravcsik’s argument would be valid even if the Parliament had full control 
of EU policy-making. In contrast, another observation was very much commented on over 
recent years: the more powers Parliament obtained (it now has an almost equal standing with 
the Council of Ministers in EU legislation4), the lower citizens’ participation in European 
elections became. To some authors, it even seems that the democratic deficit has worsened ever 
since the first direct elections to the EP, in 1979 (Mény 2002).5 Consequently, we must admit 
that the “easy” solution to increase the political production of the Parliament (within the above-
mentioned constraints) did apparently not suffice to convince EU citizens of the usefulness and 
trustworthiness of European democracy. Or, at least, it did not give them the impression that 
bothering to vote would be worth the trouble as much as in national elections. 
 
This paper intends to address the present state of European democracy by focussing on 
institutional and procedural issues related to the European elections. It will, however, also be 
necessary to spend some time on the construction of a European politics, i.e. the role being 
played by European and national political parties and the prospect of rendering the European 
polity more political, in the sense that ideological competition should become more prominent 
and opposition to European policy decisions more effective. In order to provide a wider 
perspective on the political and social factors influencing these debates the paper starts with a 
                                                   
2 Perhaps still the most coherent text elaborating these reform goals is resolution Duhamel. 
3  Although it must be added that some proponents of democratic theory stress that the rule of law and 
protection of individual rights and freedoms are the essential elements of a modern democracy. 
4  But still with the exception of quasi-constitutional issues such as the Union’s own resources, treaty 
reform, or electoral procedures, plus the competences that have remained at the national level (tax and 
spending, among others). 
5  Not surprisingly, this provokes some academic observers to envisage the abolition of the European 
Parliament as one possible solution to the constitutional predicaments of the European Union 
(Brunkhorst 2006, Menon 2009). See also van der Eijk/Mark Franklin 1996. 
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review of critical voices commenting on the socio-economic elite character and the 
imperviousness of EU policy-making (see, for example, Auer 2010, Schmidt 2010). 
 
 
2. The democratic and the social deficit of the EU: no way out? 
 
A massive body of literature from various disciplines, notably European governance studies, 
political history of European integration, and European constitutionalism has arrived at the 
widely recognized conclusion that the “multi-actor, multi-functional, and multi-level” (Curtin 
et al. 2010: 933) mode of the Euro-polity (Schmitter 2000) makes it futile to derive inspiration 
from nation or even non-nation state systems. 6 Concomitantly, a considerable literature on the 
so-called “social deficit” of the EU has accumulated over the past 15-20 years. It started with an 
analysis of several veto-points and quasi-constitutional “traps” in EU decision-making 
representing serious obstacles to tackle social policy questions, notably for member state 
governments having such inclinations (Scharpf 1999). More recently, these criticisms have been 
sharpened and extended. It is now claimed by some scholars that the whole project of European 
integration may be considered as an almost hypocritical endeavor: talk of constitutionalism 
without any constitution in a thick meaning of the term, democratic rhetoric without effective 
democracy at the European level, and talk of citizens’ rights without the competences and 
institutional resources to implement most of them (Bartolini 2005, 2010). Other commentators 
insist on a systemic incompatibility between representative democracy and European 
governance (Scharpf 2009) and even question the desirability of reform efforts seeking to 
democratize the EU, deploring the absurdity of achieving “democracy through market” 
(Schulz-Forberg/Stråth 2010) or the futility of bringing the rationally ignorant voter to the 
European ballot box (Majone 2009). 
 
At first sight, these quite contradictory claims seem to confirm Cécile Leconte’s observation that 
in the history of ideas concerning the European Union originally pro-integration terms have 
often been hijacked by euroskeptics (Leconte 2010: 54). But if we look closer we find that the 
creativity of intergovernmentalist and new governance authors in finding new ways of 
defending the EU’s legitimacy comes at a price: (1) It undermines the notion of citizenship as 
well as the conditions for democratic accountability and (2) it  implies tacitly that further 
integration is not really recommended for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, those who 
bemoan the lack of social policies at the EU level and, therefore, have become more and more 
skeptical towards rhetoric of European democracy may well have hoped for a long time that the 
socio-economic difficulties they have identified could be tackled by the European Union. The 
problem can thus be rephrased: are there plausible reasons to keep the present divided and 
multi-actor system of European governance or are we in need of a more democratic approach of 
problem-solving, including a stronger involvement of the electors and the elected? 
 
The governance account of the EU’s evolution leaves one question open: is the non-popular 
system of governance really successful or, to put it differently, what is the definition of 
regulatory success? How is efficiency -  as opposed to participation and openness – defined? 
                                                   
6  Further on, Curtin et al. refer to the “sheer contestedness of concepts that are drawn from the 
constitutional state and then applied to different and possibly non-state levels of governance.” (p. 939). 
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Perhaps the 2008-10 financial crisis has somewhat modified the optimism and satisfaction 
expressed by many proponents of “new governance”. Let us turn for a moment to the U.S., a 
political system which not only is often considered to be a model for the net-worked, non-
hierarchical and “non-democratic” (Rose 2010: 14) European governance of late, but was also an 
inspiration for much theorizing and empirical research on the subject. At the beginning of 2011, 
the Financial Crisis Commission’s final report summarized its findings thus: 
 
“The Commission concluded that this crisis was avoidable. It found widespread failures in financial 
regulation; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance; excessive borrowing and risk-taking by 
households and Wall Street; policy makers who were ill prepared for the crisis; and systemic 
breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels.”7 
 
 Of course, the level of competence of “non-democratic” regulation is likely to be as variable as 
many outcomes of popular representation. Outside of fringe groups, parliamentarians have not 
distinguished themselves as particularly lucid voices warning of things to come. Yet, the above 
assessment of a rather important regulatory domain would also seem to prohibit an 
accommodating evaluation of regulatory governance without political involvement. It may be 
useful for some market operators to adhere to the neo-realist tenet of the superior quality of 
types of governance that are unencumbered by concerns of popular legitimacy and democratic 
accountability. They may indeed prefer to argue that people “do not have” or “should not 
have” different preferences and values in certain fields and issues (Bartolini 2010: 22). If 
combined with a casual attitude towards the rule of law and a sweeping defense of the 
inapplicability of democratic norms to the European Union such arguments risk to confirm 
reservations about the whole project. It is perhaps for such reasons that even an author who for 
a long time was quite skeptical of (European) popular democracy now argues that bringing the 
people into debates on policy is necessary to secure a democratic endorsement of technocratic 
measures that impose widespread and immediate costs in pursuit of long-term benefits: 
“Elected policymakers are able to provide the necessary political counterweight to the Central 
Bank's technocrats” (Majone 2010: 150). 
 
At present, democracy is usually not seen in Europe and the Western world as a Schumpeterian 
mechanism to choose the governing elite but as a form of rule which respects a certain number 
of normative principles: equal respect and concern for each citizen (Bellamy 2009), individual 
self-determination (Nettesheim 2005), and accountability of the governors (Mansbridge 2003). 
In other words, democracy is not limited to elections but comprises the protection of 
fundamental rights, the rule of law and a certain amount of redistribution in order to guarantee 
equality of opportunity. If the new governance argument tends to defend the exclusion of 
certain policies from electoral influences, notably at the European level, it claims that essential 
democratic norms are better respected than in representative and majoritarian democracy. In 
contrast, historians and social scientists criticizing the EU’s social deficit arrive at the conclusion 
that this particular set-up of EU governance will favor strong organized interests, lead to an 
untenable situation for the majority of European citizens, whose interests and preferences are 
not respected, and hence undermine the long-term stability of the European Union as a polity. 
For example, Bartolini (2005) argues that European integration consists in the selective removal 
of internal boundaries (primarily economic and legal) and the openness of external boundaries 
(as demonstrated by the successive enlargements of the EU and the flexible integration of non-
                                                   
7  Available at http://fcic.gov/report/conclusions 
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member countries). This boundary removal and de-differentiation undermines what he calls 
“political structuring” at the EU level. 
 
However, one major caveat must be added at the end of this section before we discuss possible 
ways to structure a political Europe. In view of past and current political trends in most 
member states it is far from clear that more electoral politics in the EU would lead to more 
social policy. One deep misconception in much of the social deficit literature is that a return to 
more national influence would also mean more equitable policies. Despite all the complaints 
about "social dumping" and "free-riding," EU member-states seem reconciled to tolerating 
substantial differences in the provision of social services and extraction of taxes at the national 
level (Schmitter 2000: 44). Wolfgang Streeck’s analytical narrative of the transformations of 
German capitalism and notably the failure or unwillingness of national political leadership to 
safeguard the welfare state makes it somewhat difficult to believe in the rescue of the welfare 
state at the European level (Streeck 2010). Moreover, if one considers the depiction of the fight 
over the services directive by one of the most outspoken proponents of European 
“politicization” there emerges no particular priority to adress the situation of those citizens who 
have come to be called the “integration losers” (Hix 2006). 
 
To summarize, the contradiction between the acknowledgement of deficits of policy output 
(e.g., in social policy or financial regulation) and the reluctance to move towards an overhaul of 
participatory and electoral input could in the long run put at risk the viability of the European 
Union as a political system. The arguments developed here need not rest on the presumption of 
a real risk of rolling back European integration, a claim which would at any rate be quite 
speculative. The goal of what follows rather is to explore the rationale for a reform of European 
politics. At the European level great obstacles to increase citizens’ trust and political allegiance 
exist and make it a challenge to improve democratic representation. But most academic and 
political pundits are still convinced that a number of current problems are beyond the reach of 
the European nation-state. If this widespread claim is true creating a favorable and more 
democratic institutional and political environment for effective European policy-making seems 
desirable. 
 
 
3. Elements of a theory of European democracy: who should be represented and 
how? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, current political ambiance appears to be oriented towards 
constitutional settlement, although different views on the stability of the present settlement 
persist (Majone 2006). Reformatory zeal is not the motto of the day, neither in politics nor in 
academia.8 However, the case law of some national constitutional courts in the context of treaty 
ratification continues to underline the democratic weaknesses of European governance and, of 
course, comes to the conclusion that real democracy must remain limited to the nation-state. 
                                                   
8 I do injustice to a certain number of reform proposals that can be found in the literature but most of 
them are either directed to (important) practical issues (see notably Leonard 1997 and Arbuthnott/ 
Leonard 2003) or, conversely, tend to remain at a very abstract level of constitutional design (Menéndez 
2009). For more recent initiatives, see the papers published by Notre Europe over the last few years and 
discussed below. 
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While this is not entirely new, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in its decision of 20099 on 
the German ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has made some innovative statements on EU 
electoral procedures, which, in its view, foreclose any possibility that the European Parliament 
could ever be a fully legitimate body directly representative of European citizens. What is new 
about this judgment is indeed the critical focus on the democratically elected institution of the 
European Union. It almost seems as if the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) had 
somewhat acquiesced with respect to its long-standing competition with the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) and is now more than ever using concerns about the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Parliament to defend its nation-state centered positions. The 
judgment has been widely commented and criticised, notably by German legal scholars.10 The 
purpose of the following sections is therefore not a rehearsal of these arguments but a 
conceptualisation of the three ideas centrally related to any attempt to strengthen European 
democracy: representation, democracy and equality. 
 
 
On political representation 
 
Representation and democracy, although often treated as almost identical concepts, can and 
should be examined separately. As Manin has reminded us, representation was a system 
devised by “English aristocrats, American landowners, and French lawyers at the end of the 
18th century” which proved astonishingly flexible (1997: 234). Hannah Pitkin has shown that 
the origins of representation were obligations to be obeyed rather than rights to be invoked 
against the monarch (2004). In a more symbolic vein, the representative role of the monarch had 
to be transferred ideationally from the person of the king to the parliamentary assembly 
(Manow 2008). In some traditions, notably the British notion of “King in Parliament” the role of 
Parliament was not at all seen to “mirror” society at large but to be a restricted circle of lords 
and commons mainly dealing with the business concerning its members and, in earlier times, 
defending its powers against the king (Sternberger 1967: 529). This was justified as a political 
necessity which enabled a wise, responsible elite to “discern the true interests of their country” 
(Hamilton). The introduction of universal suffrage thus radically changed the symbolic 
significance and the political role of Parliament. Moreover, it had a strong socio-economic 
effect. In Frank Schimmelfennig’s expression, “democratization is the shift to a regime in which 
taxation and distribution follow the preferences of the majority rather than that of small, 
affluent elites” (2010: 215). 
 
This rather provocative statement directs our attention to the fact that representation as such 
has a number of objectives which are not easily reconciled with modern democracy. The 
standard account of political representation is still somewhat contradictory, as is nicely 
rendered in Andrew Glencross’ expression that “representation is in effect an agent that creates 
a principal” (2008: 3). Moreover, as Hanna Pitkin has admitted herself, her famous argument 
that representation at its most direct interpretation means that “somebody or something not 
literally present is nevertheless present in some non-literal sense” has a paradoxical core (2004: 
                                                   
9 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009 
10 For a more detailed review of these academic responses to the decision see my Constitutional identity 
politics ? (2010). 
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336). Finally, like much democratic theory it is inherently restrained to serve the analytical 
needs of a theoretical framework where the nation state is the sole reference point (Pollack et al. 
2009: 26). According to these authors there are five major fallacies in many models of 
representation: 
 
 representation was invented to make democracy work in large scale political 
communities; 
 the absent is the people which acts via the representative body; 
 representation is a direct social relationship between representative and represented; 
 representatives have to be elected; 
 good representation is equal to responsiveness. 
 
If we agree with the first tenet, it must still be said that the necessity of representation, at least in 
its democratic incarnation, arose with the enlargement of the political units to be represented. 
The last issue, the connection between representation and responsiveness has been rephrased 
by other authors as the tension between responsive and responsible government, which plays a 
particular role in European Union politics as it has been shown that parties in government act 
differently at the European level from parties in opposition. Another analytical dimension is 
whether representation is mainly seen as a top-down or a bottom-up process. According to 
Andeweg, the acid test for representation from below is ‘responsiveness’, the degree to which 
representatives express the opinions of the represented, whereas the test for representation 
from above is ‘accountability’ (2003: 152). Concurring with Manin, Pitkin and other observers of 
the transformation of representative government into a more elitist variety he forecasts that 
accountability mechanisms will become the dominant relation between electors and elected. 
 
As we can see, representation as an object of study has not ceased to attract interest (Pitkin 2004, 
Lord/Pollak 2010). As representative government has become the norm in all nation-states and 
reality in many of them, scholarly interest has increasingly expanded to its meaning and 
significance at the international and suprantional level. Although in the national context equal 
representation of all societal groups, including minorities of different types, is far from being an 
issue of the past (see the various movements for more autonomy in several regions of EU 
member states or the difficulties of federal member states such as Belgium) it is, of course, an 
even bigger challenge in a transnational context. In analysing non-national forms of 
representation we still have to take into account the strong influence of international relations 
theory and diplomatic practice. In the words of Lord and Pollak (2010: 117) “the EU seems to 
challenge the notion that representation within and beyond the state can and should be two 
distinct things, confined beyond the state to a monochrome of diplomatic representation, while, 
within the state, taking on all the colours of the domestic political rainbow.” To summarise 
what representation could mean today, independently from the way it is produced technically, 
we could say that it is a mode of government executed by an institutional structure which 
reflects in a less than perfect but nevertheless normatively convincing manner those who are 
represented. The representatives make use of their own judgment and external expertise to act 
in the best interest of the represented and often have also a certain responsibility toward the 
territorial unit which has mandated them. 
 
A crucial problem affecting political representation at present is the significant change of 
powers and ambitions of public actors which has occurred in most European countries. 
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Government was transformed from a carrier of sovereign powers to a service provider in an 
increasing number of domains. A trend towards deregulation and lean government changed 
the public sector (Moran 2003). This concerned not only the distribution of tasks between the 
private and public sectors but also the objectives and instruments of governmental activities. 
For instance, Andeweg observes that governments are giving more autonomy to bureaucratic 
agencies, while at the same time reinforcing mechanisms of accountability through 
inspectorates, ombudsmen, auditors, internal regulators, etc., amounting to what has been 
called an ‘audit explosion’ (2003: 156). These reforms may have reduced the steering capacity of 
the public sector, and in particular its capacity to exercise control over the policies of 
government. A standard response to such discontents is to increase public scrutiny and 
transparency of decision-making, in other words accountability. Political theory is of course 
aware of the fact that governments can to some extent escape from public scrutiny and public 
control. To what extent is difficult to say because “as conceptual discussions of representation 
indicate, even the yardsticks are difficult to establish, not to speak of their realization.” (Manin 
et al. 1999: 23). All this is to say that the limited range of powers of European policy-making, the 
conferral of enumerated competencies, finds a certain equivalence in the shrinking purview of 
public authority in the member states. This leads to the question how, in such an environment, 
we should define European representative democracy. 
 
 
Democracy in Europe – its origins and transformations 
 
From the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to the early 1990's, the 
strengthening of the European Parliament's role was seen as the only necessary institutional 
amendment that needed to be made for the purposes of democratic progress. Certainly, 
proposals for reform were primarily made to bring forward the European integration process 
and to create a dynamic acceleration, not because of doubts about the legitimacy of the 
European Communities. The liberal theory of democracy, from the time of the creation of 
traditional nation-states, was not considered to become obsolete at some point in the future. The 
appropriate standard of democracy was seen to be reached so long as the EP was fulfilling basic 
standards of legislative power, according to national standards. Therefore the institutional 
reforms in the 1970's mainly referred to the EP, and the introduction of direct elections was 
viewed as a significant achievement. 
 
Following the Single European Act, which introduced the vote by qualified majority in the 
Council, and especially the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the 
pillar system,  the character of theoretical discourse changed. Scholars began to wonder 
whether the EU had perhaps progressed far enough already. The core of the debate now was 
how the imbalance of powers in favour of the executive had to be restricted by correcting the 
inter-institutional relationship within the Communities, and not merely by strengthening the 
EP's role. Traditional nation-state models were applied to the EU and influenced suggestions 
for institutional amendments, most famously in Claus Offe's one-liner that, had the European 
Union been a state and were it to apply for membership in the European Union, it would fail to 
qualify for membership because of the lack of democratic credentials. The discourse on a 
“democratic deficit” and the democratisation of the EU was linked to the concept of 
constitutionalism and issues involving "good governance" in the EU. 
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In the late 1990's the debate entered its third stage. Much research now contended that 
traditional democratic models were simply not applicable to the complex structure of the EU. 
This was the result of expanding the EU’s competences and its continuing evolution towards 
becoming a political organization. The debate was less characterised by the notion of 
democratic deficit than by the deficits of conventional theories of democracy. Democracy, 
legitimacy and constitutionalism, it was thought, must be appropriately designed under the 
conditions of a post-national reality. For example, Martin Nettesheim identified the influence of 
the integration process on democratic theories as the key issue at this current stage of the EU‘s 
development (Nettesheim 2005). 
 
In a more institutionalist approach Frank Schimmelfennig argues that the emerging democratic 
features of the European Union are the result of a normative discourse pronounced 
predominantly by what he calls the “weaker” institutional actors of the EU (Schimmelfennig 
2010). Mark Pollack had already claimed earlier that the European Parliament was the only EU 
institution that did not fit into the principal-agent account of European integration (Pollack 
2003) since it did not obviously help member states to monitor compliance of incomplete 
contracts and self-obligations. He concluded that the reason for the Parliament’s establishment 
and its subsequent strengthening through direct elections and extension of powers was 
normative: the attractiveness of democratic norms  supplemented rational-choice arguments 
which hitherto were defended by intergovernmentalists as the driving force of integration. 
Schimmelfennig first notes that what he calls “demand-side conditions” prevalent in nation-
state democratization are conspicuously absent in the EU: a culturally integrated and politically 
structured demos, redistributive conflict between elites and citizens, and social unrest creating 
revolutionary threats (2010: 212). He then goes on to show that at three critical transformative 
moments in the EU’s history (which fit quite well the above stages of democratic theory 
development) ”efficiency-oriented moves toward further European market integration 
challenged democratic norms” (229) and, as a result, “even the governments that were most 
skeptical of the strengthening of supranational organizations consented to extending the EP’s 
powers in the end.” (226) The conceptual value of Schimmelfennig’s narrative is to show that 
important steps in the democratization of the EU are the result of deliberative institutional and 
actor competition using normative arguments. It also makes clear that each step forward 
depends on the will of some of these “weaker”actors to engage and on particular external 
shocks that require an efficiency-oriented response. 
 
It has been said many times that representative democracy is under attack. The rise of 
deliberative theory (and practice) can be interpreted as one attempt to cure some of those 
discontents. However, many of the solutions suggested by a new industry of deliberative 
activism11 bring about their own shortcomings. At least for the time being, and despite wide-
spread scepticism of the parliamentary system it is hard to imagine a structure of public policy 
without well defined mechanisms of representation. In his standard narrative of representative 
democracy, which admittedly focusses on national democratic systems, Manin analyses the 
origins of what he calls parliamentary democracy. In his view the parliamentary democracy of 
the 19th century still bears the notions of relative independence from the electorate we find in 
                                                   
11  For an example, see http://www.deliberative-democracy.net 
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pre-democratic representative systems (Manin 1997). MPs can be seen as trustees rather than 
delegates having received a mandate from the electors. 
 
After the wide-spread adoption of universal suffrage electoral competition needed structuring 
in order to avoid a cacophony of individual and factional interests. With the birth of the modern 
political party parliamentary democracy was transformed, in Manin’s terms, into party 
democracy. The life of parliamentarians was now strongly determined by external scrutiny, less 
from the electorate directly than from party functionaries. Hans Kelsen famously quipped: “It is 
illusion or hypocrisy to maintain that democracy is possible without political parties” 
(op.cit.: 211). One important condition for the stability of party democracy was the existence of 
clearly identifiable social groups, stable and meaningful social or political collectivities, whose 
essential interests and ideas were quite homogenous and did not much change over time. With 
increasing individualisation, for which certain observers hold the European Union at least 
partially responsible, and new media providing a floor for personalized messages from political 
leaders to the electorate a further evolution of modern representative democracy took place. 
The role of parties was reduced in favor of direct communication. Politics acquired some 
characters of theatrical acting and the electorate was slowly transformed into spectators of what 
Manin called “audience democracy” (op.cit.: 220). One aspect of this latest transformation of 
representative democracy is important for this study: the fact that trust, which was important in 
the origins of representative government, again takes a central role. In other words, the age of 
voting on the incumbents' record may introduce new structures of political and electoral 
accountibility. 
 
In conclusion of this part of the essay it seems appropriate to have a short look at the legal 
definition of democracy in the context of the European Union. For many years legal scholarship 
on European integration focused less on the principle of democracy than the rule of law. 
Democracy only slowly became a guiding principle of political actors but was not yet seen as a 
condition that the Community had to respect in order to be legal under its members' 
constitutions. But with Article F of the EU Treaty in the Maastricht version democracy found its 
way into the treaties - not yet as a basis for the Union itself, but rather with a view to the 
Member States' systems. This leap was not made until the Treaty of Amsterdam whose Article 6 
TEU specified that the principle of democracy also applies to the Union. External provisions 
buttress this internal constitutional development, for instance national provisions such as the 
amended Article 23 (1) of the German Basic Law. At the European level, the exact legal meaning 
of the principle of democracy is yet to be determined. 
 
In the TEU and TFEU after Lisbon, under the headings "The Democratic life of the Union" and 
"Citizens' Rights", respectively, a number of seemingly unconnected provisions are assembled; 
according to one observer “it will require a singular intellectual effort to reconstruct them as a 
meaningful whole.” (von Bogdandy 2007: 35) What can be said is that to realize the principle of 
democracy, whether understood as an opportunity to participate, as a check on governmental 
abuse, or as individual self-determination, is more challenging under the Union's organisational 
set-up than within the nation-state. Greater private freedom in the Union can get in conflict 
with member states’ self-determination. The Union's constitutive diversity and the complexity 
of its Constitution are some of the factors that place greater restrictions on the realisation of the 
principle of democracy by way of electing representative institutions. One guiding principle 
was reiterated many times by the European Parliament: the Union is based on a dual structure 
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of legitimacy, the totality of the Union's citizens, and the peoples of the EU organised by their 
respective Member States' constitutions. However, following an elegant turn of phrase of Peter 
Huber, European democracy should strive to give the individual citizen a sufficiently effective 
opportunity to influence the basic decisions of European policy through unional as well as 
national procedures (the unional principle of democracy; quoted in von Bogdandy, op.cit.). To 
what extent “sufficient” opportunities depend on the respect of electoral equality will be the 
subject of the next part. 
 
 
Equality in a quasi-federal polity 
 
Ever since the privileges of aristocracy and wealth in the constitution of government and the 
conduct of public affairs have been abolished the rule of any political order calling itself 
democracy is based on the principle of “One person, one vote, one value (or weight)”. Although 
the last part of the principle is often left out, it has always been an integral part of the definition 
of democratic equality. It would thus be too easy to be content with neutral electoral rules 
allowing every adult person to take part in an election without consideration of his or her 
professional status, socio-economic standing or religious allegiance. It was indeed a major 
breakthrough, accompanied by much hand-wringing and hesitations, both in the US and in 
Europe, to allow the majority of the people to determine the political fate of the community by 
also being represented as the majority in the arguably most important governmental institution, 
the Parliament. Therefore, even one person – one vote was far from being self-evident until 
quite recently. 
 
Free, equal and secret elections are part of the democratic acquis in Europe at least since the 
Second World War, despite the fact that there were several exceptions to the rule until the early 
1980s. But free, equal and secret elections are only a necessary condition for equal consideration 
of individual citizens, not a sufficient guarantee for near-perfect representation of defined 
groups or regions in a political system. Important questions of the design of institutions, the 
apportionment of parliamentary seats and of due respect for territorial sub-units, especially in 
federal systems, have been and will remain on the agenda when democratic rule is to be 
established outside of unitary nation-states, or even within them. This paper does not adhere to 
the skeptical position of some legal theorists who maintain that the principle of equality is void 
of meaning and should not be used in normative debates. In the words of Peter Westen “every 
moral and legal argument can be framed in the form of an argument for equality. People then 
will answer arguments for equality by making counterarguments for equality.” (1982: 596) 
Westen’s argument certainly reflects a general problem of legal scholarship and of adjudication: 
to treat the equal equally and the unequal unequally can be extremely complicated in practical 
situations. There are even those who say that if one turned the principle around (treat the equal 
unequally and the unequal equally) one would be closer to the traditional principle of equal 
treatment before the law. Despite such principled doubts about the normative justification of 
perfect equality, and its practical implementation, we  have to admit that, at least in the context 
of institutional design, near-perfect proportional representation of populations, territories, 
ethnic, religious or other distinct groups, is extremely pervasive and intuitive as a normative 
and a practical rule. Therefore, democratic polities are built on the respect of a certain form of 
equal electoral representation. 
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Looking at the reality of electoral design, however, it emerges that equal representation is full of 
exceptions. Although ethnically rather homogenous, a federal system like Germany is full of 
Proporz rules, that is measures to safeguard proportional representation of catholics and 
protestants, of territorial sub-units (large or small; net payer or net recipient in the cross-Länder 
financial compensation scheme; governed by the center-left or the center-right), and, at least ex 
post, of certain professional categories. This principle, which is to a certain extent contradicting 
near-perfect equal representation, is derived from the 18th century idea mentioned above that 
any legislative assembly or other representative body should mirror as closely as possible the 
variety of situations, interests and preferences to be found in the wider population. 
 
The GFCC was certainly not the first to discover the violation of the one vote – one value 
principle in the European Parliament but the importance it attributes to it as a justification for 
its dismissive assessment of the democratic credibility of the European Parliament appears 
exaggerated in some ways. There are long tracts of the judgment speaking about the importance 
of democracy as a constitutive element for the sovereignty of a member state, notably Germany. 
It is in these paragraphs that the GFCC considers the European Parliament to be structurally 
unable ever to become a source of direct democratic legitimacy. The main reason for this, 
according to the court, is the very strong discrepancy between the electoral impact of citizens 
from different Member States. This is presented to be an inacceptable violation of the principle 
of electoral equality, which is also jeopardized by the attribution of EP seats according to 
national quota. 
 
As we have seen above, equality must be seen as an ideal norm which can never be attained in 
political or even jurisprudential reality. The institutional systems of the democratic world 
abound with different methods to balance the interests of groups or territorial units which 
nevertheless share one characteristic: they invariably violate the rule of near-perfect equality of 
representation. To give but two examples: in the US Electoral College, a body which signifies 
the direct electoral bond between American citizens and the most federal institution of the 
Union, the President, the individual electoral weight of inhabitants of some small states like 
Wyoming is about four times higher than that of a Californian (Alber 2009). In elections to the 
House of Representatives there are also, albeit smaller, differences between regions. 
Furthermore, in most Western democracies urban constituencies are underprivileged compared 
to rural regions in order to compensate for the difference in population density which would 
make it impossible for rural interests to make their voice heard. Pursuant to the German 
Electoral Law for the federal elections a constituency has only to be redrawn if it deviates more 
than 25% from the average population.12 It becomes obvious, then, that the acceptable deviation 
from the equality principle is a matter of degree. One would need substantive arguments 
referring to the particular characteristics of the Europolity to justify, for instance, that a 
deviation of 1:10 is inacceptable whereas a deviation of 1:4 would be acceptable. As 
Rose/Bernhagen note, “there is no standard for assessing when the degree of inequality in 
representation crosses a notional line between marginal variation and malapportionment” 
(2010: 5). 
 
                                                   
12  § 3 Abs. 3 Bundeswahlgesetz 
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Equality in a wider sense encompasses also the outcome of a certain electoral result in terms of 
influence, for instance in policy-programming and –making or in choosing persons for 
leadership posts. In this consequentialist vein, one would have to take into the equation the 
experience that large blocks of votes have a disproportionally larger influence in any 
representative body. As many British, Polish, or Spanish MEPs would volunteer to testify, the 
influence of German MEPs in the European Parliament can hardly be overestimated and is 
certainly beyond their percentage of less than 13% of MEPs (cf. Rose 2010, Balinski/Young 
1982). This not only because of the country’s economic impact but also because of its 
disproportional influence in political groups: In three political groups, including the two 
dominant EPP and S&D groups, German MEPs represent clearly the biggest national delegation 
and in two others (Liberals and Greens) they share this privilege with only one other country 
(UK and France, respectively). 
 
The conclusion we can draw from these observations is that in a somewhat different 
conceptualisation from Westen’s it becomes clear that different forms of equality exist but some 
are more persuasive than others. Moreover, almost always sensible solutions could be found to 
tackle real or perceived weaknesses of representative institutions. Sometimes, practicability 
issues are invoked against them, but more often than not it is the institutional interests of some 
actors that block reform. For instance, it was resistance or indifference from certain member 
states against the idea of direct electoral representation at the European level which caused the 
strongly skewed distribution of seats -  and the equality of seats between the four large member 
states – in the early European Parliaments (Duff 2010, Patijn-Report 197513). In more recent 
proposals, the introduction of a double majority, as it will soon be applied in the Council, is 
argued to counter the GFCC’s claim that the EP cannot guarantee that a majority decision in the 
Parliament represents a majority decision of the citizens of the European Union. A reduction of 
the minimum of seats for the smallest member states from 6 to 4 would require a treaty change 
but is envisaged by some authors (Pollak 2011) because it would almost as close to perfect 
proportionality as with a minimum of 1 seat per member state, a solution which would be in 
contradiction to the quasi-federal character of the Union. In view of the continued interest in 
these issues we thus have to ask why steps toward a reform of the up-stream aspect of 
European democracy are so hard to realize and which options may be feasible in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
 
4. Options for a viable system of European democracy 
 
As the previous chapter has shown parliamentary institutions continue to be the core of 
Western political systems but are undergoing systematic theoretical and practical erosion. 
Modern governance ideas and methods lead to a situation where public authority is 
increasingly divided into semiautonomous, specialised segments or sectors; that is, it has 
become multipolar and interpenetrated by state agencies and agents of civil society (Andersen 
and Burns 1999: 227). This phenomenon has been particularly well studied in the EU context 
and provoked a wide debate on whether a certain form of parliamentary democracy is an 
                                                   
13  On 24 May 1973, the Bureau of the European Parliament instructed the Political Affairs Committee to 
draw up a report on the election of the Members of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage. On 
13 January 1975, Schelto Patijn submits the report which will be adopted by the House the following day. 
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appropriate model to guide the further evolution of the EU. As Adrienne Héritier anticipated 
quite some time ago “there are factors [in the EU] working for more integrated policy-making, 
such as in monetary and fiscal policy, which will need to be embedded in the context of 
democratic decision-making” (1999: 280).  She called for institutional measures which provide 
an arena to counterbalance the tendency towards segmentation and the pursuit of 
particularistic interests. In her view, the European Parliament would be well placed to keep 
overall aspects of the interlocked polities in mind. Functional differentiation is as such not able 
to provide democratic legitimation for the European polity as a whole.  
 
The Treaty on European Union speaks a clear language. It claims that the “functioning of the 
Union is based on representative democracy”. According to Lord/Pollak this suggests a meta-
standard for evaluating how other representative principles and practices should combine 
within the European arena (2010: 125). On the other hand, the GFCC’s denial of the existence of 
a European people is widely shared and reflects the consociational or compound character of 
the Europolity. However, to quote the Treaty once more, Article 9(1) TEU expressly mentions 
the ‘citizens of the Union’, Article 10(2) TEU states that these Union citizens are represented in 
the European Parliament, and Article 14(2) TEU (Lisbon) reaffirms that the ‘European 
Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens.’ In contrast, Article 189 
EC stipulated that the European Parliament consisted of a representation of the ‘peoples of the 
States’. The Treaty of Lisbon has thus made a very clear step towards a more direct legitimating 
bond between the European level and the EU’s citizens. Nevertheless, there are serious 
obstacles of a legal and political nature in the way for more European democracy. The 
subsequent sections of this piece will look at them in turn and explore options to remove them 
while respecting the diversity of the European political structure. 
 
Three weaknesses of the EU’s political system stand out in the debate on prospects for a 
strengthened European parliamentary democracy: 
 
Lack of parliamentary control over the EU executive: The emergence of the EP as a supranational 
legislator was often interpreted from a national perspective. The EP's control over the 
executive and administrative EU organs, namely the Commission, the Council and the 
European Council, is of varying degree and power. Scholarly debate is mainly focused on 
the level of control over the Commission. Here it was often criticised that the Commission 
leadership did not represent the political composition of the EP. Hence, the reinforced link 
between the selection of the Commission President and the outcome of European elections 
by the Lisbon Treaty is seen as progress, but insufficient progress. 
 
Democratic representation within the EP: The composition of the EP has long been criticized. 
As we have seen, it is based on a rather unproportional allocation between the Member 
States that has been qualified as undemocratic, not least by the GFCC. The organisation of 
the political groups in the EP has been observed with some criticism as concerns their lack 
of independence from national influence. Similar arguments have been made with respect 
to the European political parties, notably their lack of influence on candidate selection for 
the elections to the European Parliament. 
 
The lack of Parliament's power in the legislative process: Referring (somewhat simplistically) to 
national parliaments and their influence in legislation, the post-Nice period produced a 
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peak in the debate on this lack of EP influence in the second and third pillars. This was 
interpreted as a legitimacy problem through which the governments of the Member states 
avoid having to go through the usual legislative process at national level (two-level games). 
More recently, the lack of a formal EP right of legislative initiative was seen by some as a 
major problem for full democratic legitimacy at the European level. 
 
Taken together, these critical observations suggest that the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent 
implementing acts such as the renewed framework agreement between the Parliament and the 
Commission have contributed to alleviate some of the issues raised. But there remain crucial 
voids in the manner the democracy spelled out in the Treaty is realized in political practice. We 
will address three problems which appear to be at the heart of any serious attempt to bring a 
new quality to European democracy, electoral rules, the structure of political parties and the 
proposal to politicize (bring more politics into) European governance. In doing so, we must 
remind ourselves that the most intense political fights are usually over the structure of 
institutions, not just because institutions can structure subsequent strategies, but also because 
they can affect ideas about what goals ought to be pursued in the future (Steinmo 2010: 226). 
Despite this difficulty the issues just mentioned have met with a renewed interest over the past 
few years, not only in academia but also in think tanks and policy-making circles (Magnette/ 
Papadopoulos 2006, Hix/Bartolini 2006, Duff 2010, Priestley 2010, Schleicher 2011, Oelber-
mann/Pukelsheim 2010). 
 
Electoral procedure – from second-order to a parliamentary system? 
 
In most readings of the GFCC’s Lisbon decision it emerges that the court will not accept any 
further integration unless the democratic deficit as seen by its judges is overcome (Lock 2009, 
Lehmann 2010). Even without the GFCC’s reminder it would have been clear that the latest 
treaty revision again left some unfinished business, for instance the reform of those aspects of 
the European political system which are often summarized as the political “input” to European 
policy-making. Prominent among these are reform proposals that concern the elections to the 
European Parliament and European political parties. 
 
European elections are arguably one of the best studied problems in research on the European 
Union. Many of the conflicts between the normative discourse on European democracy, not 
least in treaty provisions, and the empirical reality of European elections have been exposed in 
great detail. For the purpose of this section our focus will be on the (mostly national) rules 
governing these elections. However, it must be recalled that one important political result of 
current practice is the second-order character of European elections, i.e. the fact that these 
elections are predominantly fought over issues and topics more related to national than to 
European politics and policy-making. Immediately after the decision, in 1975, to introduce 
direct elections some wondered whether elections alone could mobilise European publics to 
take a much greater interest in European matters. A few years ago, several scholars studying 
political parties underlined that by democratising the European Parliament, the polity builders 
in Europe may have inadvertently contributed to devaluing the electoral process as a whole 
(Mair 2008: 13). A recent review article draws the conclusion that  the evidence of EU elections 
to date does not offer positive support for a politicization argument (Marsh/Mikhaylov 2010: 
19). However, the review also provides some indications for possible avenues towards creating 
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more participation and interest. It observes that most parties expend much fewer resources on 
European elections than they do on national elections and surmises that it could be possible that 
EP elections might become less second-order over time, if the EU grew more powerful relative 
to national governments. 
 
According to Franklin and Hobolt (2010) low turnout at EP elections cannot be exclusively 
attributed to electoral apathy and lack of interest in the Parliament’s (or the Union’s) policy-
making: “it is in the nature of [the European] elections to produce low voter turnout.”14 A 
rather new research field addresses indeed this “nature” of electoral procedures, especially 
from an institutional vantage point, and examines the fact that it is institutions that create the 
rules, which have their own interests that might merit some consideration. In the case of the 
European elections one crucial institutional factor is that electoral laws are for the most part 
national and oriented along the habits and traditions established in national elections (Lehmann 
2009). Duff (2010) portrays the evolution of the European Electoral Act and the difficulties 
encountered in several member states, thus showing the reluctance to yield national influence 
on electoral rules. In analysing this reluctance we may distinguish two levels of conflict: the 
quasi-federal problem of apportionment, that is the equitable concern for all member states, and 
the practical design of electoral procedure, itself a playing field for cultural and political 
contention. 
 
The problem of apportionment has been scrutinized by the European Parliament and is 
currently the object of reform proposals which intend to remove this question from political 
bargaining, on the basis of a mathematically underpinned model of seat distribution after future 
enlargements.15 It is one of the oldest problems connected to elections, not only but 
predominantly in federal systems. One important lesson to learn from a classic account of how 
to implement practically the one person – one vote principle is the similarity, or even the 
interconnectness, of apportionment problems in both federal systems and proportional 
representation (PR) systems (Balinski/Young 1982). In these authors’ view, the only significant 
difference between the two is the basis on which the appropriateness of apportionment is 
assessed: in federal systems it is the federal sub-units, hence territorial units with a particular 
size of population to be correctly represented, in PR it is political parties with their relative 
weight of votes. From the point of view of ideal apportionment, the essential issue of their book, 
Balinski and Young conclude that for each case it is quite obvious which method comes closest 
to the ideal of one person – one vote: Webster’s (equal to Sainte-Lagüe’s for all practical 
purposes) for federal systems and Jefferson’s (equal to d’Hondt’s) for PR. In the first case, the 
interests of both small and large sub-units are best respected, in the latter those between large 
and small parties although it is also known that d’Hondt gives results which are biased to a 
certain extent in favor of larger parties. 
 
In reality, there are of course many political systems where both normative criteria have to be 
balanced. The European case represents a mixture of federal and PR criteria just as the Federal 
Republic of Germany or Switzerland.  Even in unitary states such as France elements of federal 
                                                   
14  in press. 
15  European Parliament resolution of 11 October 2007 on the composition of the European Parliament, 
INI/2007/2169 (rapporteurs: Alain Lamassoure/Adrian Severin);  Proposal for a modification of the Act 
concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 
September 1976, INI/2009/2134 (rapporteur: Andrew Duff) 
 
 
 
 
18 
reasoning can be discerned, for instance in attributing a minimum of two deputies to each 
department. Other interesting constellations are the US Electoral College and the Canadian 
system. In the Electoral College small states are privileged (they send their representatives of 
the House plus their senators) but the "winner-takes-it-all" system compensates for this because 
"a large block of votes [] has a power beyond its numbers" (Balinski/Young 1982: 9). In Canada 
each province is guaranteed as many members of Parliament as it has senators, and the number 
of senators varies from province to province. 
 
While in the EU system the maxima and minima and the principle of degressive proportionality 
are clearly intended to do justice to the wide difference in size of the EU member states the 
electoral procedure stipulated in the Electoral Act from the beginning (even if the UK took a 
long time to accept it) is predominantly proportional representation. According to Balinski and 
Young’s above distinction minima make little sense for proportional representation systems 
because splinter parties receiving only very few votes are normally discouraged. But in the 
European case they can be justified due to the compound character of the Europolity. 
 
While apportionment has acquired new salience in terms of legitimacy in the wake of the 2009 
GFCC decision on Lisbon other factors are probably more important for tackling the second-
order character of European elections. Schleicher (2011) scrutinizes the “mismatch” between 
high constitutional expectations and the practical design of the vote. Accepting the 
consociational nature of the EU which, by using proportional representation and giving 
multiple vetoes, ensures that “territorial minorities have representation and that policy cannot 
be made without widespread agreement”, he nevertheless maintains that there are conflicts 
between the goal of making the EP a direct popular check on the Commission and Council (its 
institutional purpose) and the way the elections are organised. He underlines that there are 
tools to create electoral incentives that accord an advantage to territorially based parties which 
are willing to appeal to voters other than those of their own constituency. However, the EP was 
formally not intended to be consociational – it was supposed to provide clear guidance about 
the preferences of European voters about EU policies. The question raised by Schleicher is thus 
whether electoral rule change can provide a tool for realigning institutional purpose and 
practical implementation. 
 
Schleicher’s most radical idea is to require parties to attain a certain threshold of votes in more 
than one member states. He would draw inspiration from the regulation on Europarties which 
requires parties to be present or to campaign in at least a quarter of the member states. Hence, 
in Schleicher’s terms a party presenting candidates for election to the European Parliament 
would need to have a minimum electoral success in several member states. Such a reform 
would probably lead to a significant reduction of the parties represented in the EP. This may be 
less of a problem in the view of an American scholar who is used to a two-party system but 
would be quite contrary to the argument that Europarties showing up on the ballot would 
provide the opportunity for voters in some member states to vote for parties which do not exist 
at the national level. 
 
A less problematic proposal, taken up by other authors (Oelbermann/Pukelsheim 2010), 
concerns the design of the ballots used in European elections, which should not carry the 
acronyms of national parties but those of their European partners. There may be linguistic 
details to be sorted out but from a rational-choice perspective such a seemingly small change 
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would enable voters to exercise their accountability function in direct relation to the European 
parties. This would of course take time over several electoral cycles but, as Schleicher puts it, it 
would allow electors to establish “running tallies” of the political decisions made by European 
parties, thus clarifying the purpose of the vote. Finally, since in most modern elections the most 
relevant tool voters have for overcoming their ignorance of politics is the heuristic provided by 
a political party (cf. also Manin 1997) the repeated practices of voters would contribute to 
growing an understanding of European politics. Two problems with Schleicher’s ideas may 
occur: (1) On what political issues should EP voters form their “running tallies” if few salient 
policies are decided at the EU level, and if due to the institutional compromises prevalent in 
European decision-making no clear impact of separate parties can be singled out? (2) There 
have already been warnings from MEPs and academic commentators that turnout may fall even 
further due to the new and strange party names. This development can of course not be ruled 
out and may possibly create the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
The last argument brings us to Andrew Duff’s proposals for electoral reform (see Duff 2010) 
because similar objections have been raised against his most important idea, the introduction of 
a single EU-wide constituency for a small number of additional MEPs (Duff, op.cit.: 58-61).16 
Duff has been patiently pursuing this project over many years and encountered considerable 
skepticism not only in the Council but also in Parliament. Fellow MEPs have argued, for 
instance, that such a constituency would create a two-class system of MEPs, that it would 
intensify the personalization and mediatization of electoral campaigns, and that the 
presentation of foreign-sounding candidates would alienate voters even more than is the case 
now. Andrew Duff’s rejoinder is that “the addition of a transnational list elected from a pan-EU 
constituency would enhance the popular legitimacy of the European Parliament by widening 
voter choice. The citizen-elector would be able to articulate politically his or her plural 
citizenship, one national, the other European: two votes are better than one.” (op.cit.: 60). One 
could add that, as we have seen above in the analysis of modern representative democracy, 
personalization and mediatization are not at all limited to European elections and that in view 
of the lack of interest at present this might be an acceptable price to pay. One problem with a 
two-votes system is that many voters are not used to it. There would be less of a problem in 
Germany than in more unitary systems because the Bundestag is elected more or less the same 
way (Erst- und Zweitstimme). 
 
At this moment, Andrew Duff’s proposal is being dealt with by the Committee on Constitu-
tional Affairs and is intended to arrive in plenary in May 2011. There are some further pro-
posals in Duff’s report that merit attention in the context of this essay: 
 
 Introduce semi-open party lists 
                                                   
16  Doc. PE440.210 of 4 November 2010. Paragraph 2 reads as follows: “[The EP] proposes that an 
additional 25 MEPs will be elected by a single constituency formed of the whole territory of the European 
Union; transnational lists will be composed of candidates drawn from at least one third of the States, and 
will be gender-balanced; each elector will be enabled to cast one vote for the EU-wide list in addition to 
their vote for the national or regional list: voting for the EU constituency will be in accordance with the 
preferential semi-open list system (whereby votes are allotted either to the party list or to individual 
candidates within a list); and seats will be allocated in accordance with the Sainte-Laguë method ; further, 
proposes that an electoral authority will be established at EU level in order to regulate the conduct and to 
verify the result of the election taking place from the EU-wide list;” 
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 Make use more widely of regional constituencies 
 Organise the elections on one or two days (Saturday and/or Sunday) in May rather than 
June 
 Facilitate the franchise for citizens living in other member states 
 
As Andrew Duff mentions in his paper perhaps the most radical effect of these changes of the 
electoral procedure would be to confront the European political parties with a real job: to select 
the candidates for the EU-wide constituency and to stage an effective campaign for them. This 
would in all likelihood transform the posture of Europarties over the years and enable them to 
acquire a more independent role with respect to national party structures. One day this might 
even radiate to the selection of other MEP candidates. It has of course been argued that to elect 
only 25 MEPs on the new transnational quota is insufficient to interest the Europarties to spend 
significant resources on the campaign. However, this claim probably underestimates the 
novelty effect and the media impact of a cross-border campaign. Moreover, it would have to be 
combined with clearer party programmes and a more proactive behavior with respect to the 
election of the Commission President. There is a certain amount of research showing that 
parties which display a clear position on European issues do better in the EP elections than 
others (Lord 2010). 
 
In summary, Duff’s EU-wide constituency would bring about most of the advantages of 
Schleicher’s multi-state thresholds without some of the latter’s possible drawbacks.17 Plural 
thresholds might well be a further step of reform once an EU-wide constituency is well 
established. Whatever will be the near-term outcome of the European Parliament’s debates, 
and, possibly, later discussions in the framework of a Convention, one pitfall of the current 
system has been laid open in this section: voters have little knowledge of the position of 
political parties on EU issues, partly because political parties do not take a clear stand on these 
issues, and partly because they do not appear in citizens’ perceptions and political reasoning 
when voting (Marsh/Mikhaylov 2010 make a similar point). Useful as the proposals mentioned 
above certainly are they may not be sufficient to create the necessary conditions for a lively 
political debate at the European level (Bardi et al. 2010). There would probably need to be a 
further element: a restructuring of European political parties. 
 
 
Internal party structuring: incumbents’ preferences and reform 
 
The essential role of political parties in representative democracy was outlined in part 3 of the 
paper. Without parties elections might be utterly incoherent events. In the early days pan-
European parties were seen (e.g., by Walter Hallstein and David Marquand) as an inevitable 
reaction to the establishment of a pan-European legislature, and their development would be 
key to its success  (Schleicher 2011: 7). For the purposes of this essay it suffices to mention 
briefly the necessary functions of political parties: aggregation of voters’ diversity of prefe-
rences, selection of competent personnel for elective office, obtaining such offices through 
successful campaigning and, finally, provide a structure for clear-cut lines of accountability. 
                                                   
17  This paper does not discuss the requirement for some reforms to change the Electoral Act and/or the 
Treaty, which necessitates unanimous ratification in all member states. 
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One further aspect of particular importance for the European level lies in their system-changing 
function: parties can have a developmental role where use of a political system by voters and 
their representatives to achieve output or input legitimacy is a capability that grows with 
practice (Lord 2010). At present, the impact of Europarties is rather weak (Van Hecke 2010) and 
their role in preference aggregation almost non-existent. 
 
A good part of empirical research has dealt with the behavior of the party groups in the 
European Parliament (Kreppel 2002, Hix et al. 2007, Lord 2010). This research is of concern here 
insofar as it provides evidence for the balance of powers between national and Europarties. 
While Simon Hix’ extensive research on EP groups is usually quoted as proof of increasing 
ideological homogeneity there are some aspects which lead to less sanguine conclusions. Hix 
has also found that the most cohesive actors in European Parliament votes are not the multi-
national party groups but their national party delegations. In the event of a conflict of loyalties 
MEPs are four times as likely to vote with their national party delegation and against their 
group than vice versa (Hix et al. 2007). Similar findings were obtained by Amie Kreppel and 
Anne Rasmussen (Kreppel 2002, Rasmussen 2008). Hence, while the organising power of 
Europarties in the Parliament should not be overestimated they display an interesting feature in 
an interinstitutional context: transnational party federations are involved with intergovern-
mental institutions (e.g., the Council of Ministers and the European Council), as well as 
supranational institutions (e.g., the European Parliament). More generally, the fact that they 
operate in both institutional circuits of the EU is a unique characteristic of transnational parties 
(Bardi 2002). Bardi even adds that, as far as parties are concerned, “intergovernmentalism has 
prevailed over supranationalism” (op.cit.: 294). Not surprisingly, then, MEPs identify somewhat 
more with their national parties than with their EP party groups (Lord 2010: 20). 
 
Hence, is Stefano Bartolini right when he argues that Europarties have been largely ‘engineered’ 
as part of a façade politicization designed to add legitimacy to otherwise technocratic and 
intergovernmental modes of decision-making (2005: 355–356)? One answer to this question 
must be to examine the accountability structures within transnational parties and between 
transnational parties and their national base. Perhaps the most important influence of national 
party leaders on Europarties is their exclusive power to select the candidates they will put on 
the (mostly closed) party lists for the EP elections. Because there is little empirical research on 
the relationship between MEPs and their national party organization (Ladrech 2009) the 
European Parliament commissioned a survey conducted by national institutes of most member 
states (European Parliament 2009), which produced the very sobering confirmation that the 
influence of European parties on candidate selection was non-existent. This creates an 
ambivalent accountability mechanism for incumbent MEPs: they have more incentive to follow 
the preferences of national parties which operate as their selectorate than their insufficiently 
interested voters (Lord 2010: 22). Taken together with the above findings on the allegiance of 
MEPs to their national delegations it becomes clear that without strengthened European parties 
there is little prospect for structural autonomy of the European party segment. 
 
Since the parties would also have the task to push for more vigorous election campaigns a 
crucial problem of the proposals on a reform of European elections and European parties is to 
create incentives for party leaders to invest in EP campaigns. Personalization in the form of 
candidates for the Commission presidency may be one way out. In general, however, there are 
justified concerns that there will be insufficient marginal returns of presenting parties to fight 
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European Parliament elections which are separate from existing national parties, notably in 
view of the risk and cost of fielding pan-European parties with yet little voter recognition. 
Generally speaking, the EU’s political opportunity structure has more relevance for domestic or 
European interest groups and other actors such as businesses or regional governments than for 
national political parties. The lack of material and political benefit that can be achieved by 
parties makes it difficult to overcome initial resistance. For parties especially in the older EU 
member states, the salience of the EU is not one that contributes to improving a party's 
competitive position, and in fact the tendency for parties to downplay or even suppress the EU 
as an issue is again a decision that rests with party leaders (Ladrech 2009: 12). 
 
These reflections on internal party structuring concur with well established findings of 
comparative federalism: party systems are shaped by the locus of political and economic 
authority. In addition, comparative federalism suggests that there are several different drivers 
to party system development. These include not only “the heterogeneity of the social cleavage 
basis (and the extent to which cleavages cross-cut territorial divisions), but also the relative (and 
perceived) power of each level of government and the institutional incentives for intra-party co-
operation.” (Thorlakson 2005: 473). It would hence not be enough to redefine the balance of 
power between transnational and national parties. Without a rebalancing of salient policy-
making competences the process of strengthening Europarties is inevitably slowed down. 
 
However, in view of the unlikelihood of an extension of EU powers in the foreseeable future 
practicable steps to reform the present party structure should be envisaged in order to make the 
Europarties more independent from national leadership and more visible for the European 
elector. Julian Priestley has recently made use of his experience of many years in the European 
Parliament to make some realistic suggestions for reform which could be done without 
changing the treaties (Priestley 2010). Priestley first notes that over the last few years 
Europarties have indeed increased their role in some decisions on the top-jobs the European 
Union has to offer. Referring to the situation of 2009/2010 when the Presidency of the European 
Council and the post of High Representative for Foreign Policy were to be selected he bemoans 
the fact that this welcome politicization comes at a price: little consideration seemed to be given 
to the qualities necessary to fill the respective posts. The successful nominees “ticked the right 
boxes” – nationality, party affiliation, size of member state, North-South-East-West, gender. A 
computer programme could perhaps do the job as well.” (op.cit.: 11). The author then identifies 
several points where the Europarties’ performance is still lacking at present and makes 
suggestions for remedies: 
 
 Add discernible democratic value to the process of personnel selection 
 Provide guidance to the EP party groups 
 Recruit individual members and activists who are more visible for public opinion 
 Democratise internal party procedures (“qualified” majority votes on posts and 
platforms, more influence on party delegates sent to congresses, designation by secret 
ballot of a candidate for the Commission presidency, possibly in open primaries) 
 Sharpen the ideological profile. 
 
Many of these suggestions will require contentious debates among party leadership and take 
time to be implemented, particularly questions such as the apportionment of votes to parties of 
very different strengths of individual membership. However, there are some positive signs. At 
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a recent hearing organised by the European Parliament18 the Green party’s Committee Member, 
Monika Frassoni, announced that the party would soon introduce individual membership. This 
is in accord with a finding in empirical research that the Green Party has benefitted most over 
the last few electoral cycles from its clear standing on many Europe-wide issues and its efforts 
to carry through a partly transnational campaign, notably in 2009 (see for instance 
Marsh/Mikhaylov 2010). 
 
A final issue of European party restructuring concerns their room for manoeuvre in the drafting 
of party manifestos and other forms of ideological position-taking. Many authors claim that for 
the moment there is little real basis for ‘left-right’ politics in a multi-national arena that tightly 
constrains how far policies can ever redistribute resources or reallocate values. A voluminous 
literature on the Europeanization of national political parties has shown convincingly that the 
constraining effect of EU rule-making on domestic ideological cleavages has reduced the 
ideological span across the party spectrum (forcefully, Mair 2008). It follows almost automa-
tically, notably in view of the above accountability structures, that Europarties can hardly be 
expected to extend the ideological space available for national parties. The same political 
parties, subject to control by the same political leadership and by the same organized 
membership, compete in both channels, the national and the European. The key actors in both 
channels remain the national parties (Mair 2008). One possible solution to address this dilemma 
and other pitfalls is seen by some commentators in a politicization of European Union 
governance, to which we will now turn. 
 
 
The politicization of the EU: waking up a sleeping giant? 
 
After the defeat of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005 two types of 
responses were prevalent. In the first group, many authors, particularly from the European 
constitutionalism literature, saw their previous fears confirmed that talk of constitution (and 
constitutional symbols) without a defining “constitutional moment” would not convince 
European citizens. Much of this literature is agreed that for the moment no promising avenue 
towards European constitutionalism offers itself (but see Isiksel 2010). In another vein, more 
benevolent observers and actors concluded that the widening gulf between the EU and its 
citizens, which became apparent not only in the negative referendums but also in opinion polls 
all over the Union, should be addressed by reforms remaining under the threshold of 
“constitutionalization” and, if possible, avoiding treaty changes. As Hix and others have argued 
on many occasions, politicization of the EU could be one of the responses to the disenchantment 
of the European public. 
 
There is no need to rehearse Simon Hix’ many books and articles defending the idea to 
politicize the EU (see notably Hix 2006 and Hix 2008). His essential tenet is that making the EU 
an arena of political contest (“limited democratic politics”) would almost inevitably make 
citizens both more interested and more attached to the Union. This is in some ways a bold claim 
because, as other authors have pointed out, such a conflictual climate could just as well lead to a 
direct questioning of the polity-character of the EU and hence a spiraling  of hostile attitudes in 
                                                   
18  The perspectives for the development of political parties at European level, 26 January 2011 
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the population to which national governments would feel obliged to respond in order to secure 
their national power base (van der Eijk/Franklin 1996, Bartolini 2005). Some years ago, there 
has been an exchange of these different views which has also produced some efforts for 
compromise, drawing together the positive elements of both approaches. Magnette/Papado-
poulos (2008) have made a rigorous attempt to evaluate the pros and cons of the politicization 
hypothesis and make some observations which are concurrent with the analysis presented here. 
Firstly, they confirm that there are institutional settings (in their term “negotiation 
democracies”) where the coupling between electoral politics and policy-making is relatively 
weak: “Even politicized - and thus hopefully popularized, if not thoroughly democratized - the 
EU would remain a negotiation democracy. […] Increasing the choices for voters is one thing, 
but finding an agreement among decision-making institutions about how to translate ‘political 
mandates’ into policies is quite another thing” (Magnette/Papadopoulos, op.cit.: 11). Hence 
politicization could just lead to a symbolic (or façade, in Bartolini’s expression) left-right 
competition which could not substantially affect the compound nature of policy-making in the 
EU. 
 
On the other hand, Magnette and Papadopoulos insist that transforming euroskepticism into 
“informed and qualified opposition” (Bartolini 2006) would probably be a risk worth taking. 
Indeed, if we consider the rising tide of literature criticizing the “hypocritical” nature of much 
discourse on European democracy the conclusion seems difficult to avoid that some more 
openness to informed opposition against European policy-making would hopefully stabilize 
rather than unseat the Europolity (see also Mair 2007 for the important distinction between 
opposition to specific policy decisions and opposition to the polity as such). But one should not 
lose sight of the fact that pro- and anti-European positions are also a matter of interests, whose 
perceptions cannot be easily transformed by deliberation only. Integration winners like the 
unskilled workers from central and eastern Europe and higher-income earners in the older 
member states support the EU while losers such as manual workers and civil servants in the 
older member states mistrust the EU. In view of the social deficit addressed at the beginning of 
this essay one problem of consociation style politics (or negotiation democracy) is their weak 
concern for structural minorities that have no territorial basis, such as modernization losers. 
Magnette and Papadopoulos conclude by suggesting the “coupling of a system of politicized 
‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct participation” (op.cit.: 22). 
 
Thinking about the politicization of the EU should not ignore some crucial differences between 
state and non-state entities with respect to the narratives they have been relying on to create a 
sense of obligation and solidarity among their citizens. At least states with a minimum 
historical “track record” represent a “connection with the past, a concept of the present and an 
assumption about what the future will look like” (Glencross 2008: 7). Nation states in their 
institutional existence appear to be independent from any specific policies, parties or interest 
groups. Any government having won a majority of votes is then pressured by media and 
opposition parties to perform the role of promoting the “general good” rather than serve the 
interests of the government's electoral constituency (Glencross, op.cit.: 8). For the EU such 
loftiness seems unattainable for the foreseeable future. There have of course been proposals to 
tackle this dilemma through a direct leap to statehood (Mancini 1998) but such a mechanical 
and unrealistic approach has not found a very favorable echo (Weiler 1998 for many others). 
However, empirical findings on European elections and parties do not exclude a more modest 
and patient attitude. Marsh and Mikhaylov (2010), for instance, conclude an extensive review of 
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research on European elections with the hope that “contrary to Reif’s pessimism, it may be that, 
with continuing integration, the EU is likely to become more politicized in the future”, although 
not necessarily or only in a pro-integration mode (17). 
 
We are thus led back to quite practical issues. Why would national politicians and parties 
expend scarce political resources on the EU when their political futures depend on national 
elections that are mainly focused on national issues? (Schmidt 2010: 21). Quite logically they 
focus on issues for which they can display full responsibility, talking less about the policy areas 
that have moved up to the EU and more about those they fully control, such as pensions, social 
policy, employment policy, purchasing power, crime in the streets, education, and so on. As 
Schmidt has it, “national leaders have been perfectly happy with the depoliticized language of 
EU level ‘policy without politics’ because this leaves them free in their national capitals to put 
any kind of political ‘spin’ of the left, right, or centre on EU policies” (28). Two-level games of 
blame-shifting and credit-taking have been the staple of Europeanization research for a long 
time but can still be observed almost daily. In the meantime, there has emerged what could be 
called a meta-blame-shifting, i.e. the continuous insistence by national leaders that new policy 
challenges will be tackled exclusively by intergovernmental means. Angela Merkel and other 
members of the German government have been particularly prolific and outspoken over the 
past year in their effort to sell the radical innovations of macroeconomic governance as 
happening without any extension of powers of the European Union (meaning predominantly 
powers of the European Parliament and the European Commission). 
 
According to Bernard Manin politicians are “persons who take the initiative in proposing a line 
of division” (1997: 226) in order to make the division an advantageous basis for political contest. 
It should be quite obvious then that it would make a big difference to which audience public 
statements are addressed. Would it be likely that promises to prioritize the interests of German, 
British, or Italian voters (or the public finances of their country) would carry the day in a pan-
European election campaign? If the minister of an important member state makes a public 
comment that some of President Barroso’s statements concerning Eurobonds make it difficult 
[for whom?] not to attribute them to his nationality, the fact that Barroso is formally entitled to 
speak for the European Commission, and hence for the European Union, suddenly becomes less 
salient. The bottom-line for any moderately informed citizen might then be that talk about 
common European interests and policy-making is a sham and that a staunch surveillance of the 
“national interest” is the only reasonable approach for any member state leadership. 
 
If some of the proposals outlined in the previous section were implemented a candidate for the 
European Parliament would have to correspond to the political preferences of citizens in more 
than one member states. For instance, candidates and parties would be obliged to obtain a 
minimum amount of information on the preference profile of the electorate  in member states 
where a transnational list appears on the ballot. Consequently, European policies would have to 
be constructed on the basis of rational evaluations of the interests of governments, stakeholders, 
and citizens of other member states. Speaking of a politicization of Europe therefore does not 
make much sense without a parallel reinforcement of the actors of political contention, the 
parties and their candidates. 
 
Of course, there are practical difficulties for non-native speakers to make public appearances in 
other Member States but these could to a large extent be tackled with some good will and 
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resources. Moreover, some head-hunting might identify hitherto uninterested candidates with 
linguistic and other qualities, who might never have considered to get on a national list. It has 
been shown in empirical studies that campaigning and media reports represent very important 
cues for voters, in particular when they are somewhat uncertain or feel insufficiently 
informed.19 The latter aspect is a standard response to Eurobarometer and other polls. 
Initiatives to increase public awareness of European elections and their political stakes are 
hence not (only) in the selfish institutional interest of the European Parliament (as some 
skeptics surmise since the dawn of ages) but are quite certain to focus voters’ attention on the 
comparison of their own preferences with those of the party positions on offer – in a European 
context. In fact, we may be witnessing the commencement of transnational politics right now. 
MEPs and national governments of the same political complexion have been in open 
disagreement on salient policy issues more often than ever.20 While this is still a rather 
exceptional situation it could show the way towards more self-confident European political 
elite. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The late Alan Milward was not known as a naïve proponent of European democracy. His 
emphasis when developing the narrative of European integration was on member states’ 
economic interests and the way they tried to obtain satisfaction of these interests through 
intergovernmental bargaining. However, Milward intentionally refrained from making 
predictions on how the Union might develop, including possible steps towards a European 
democratic system. Focussing on economic history did not prevent him to see the decisive 
influence of democratic practice on the developmental path of the European Union. In 1993 he 
stated: “It is by their votes in [referendums and elections] that citizens will continue to exercise 
the preponderant influence in defining the national interest by shaping national policy. […] 
Political parties seeking office continue to present to the electorate the concepts of European 
'integration' and 'unification' as grand general ideas, which they either favour or oppose. Would 
they not be wiser to descend to the detail of the relationship of any particular policy proposal to 
the available European international frameworks for the advancing of it?” (Milward et al. 1993: 
201, 31). 
 
Electors are not voting aloof of the Zeitgeist that prevails in European politics. Current 
institutional structures perpetuate the very obstacles that are invoked as a reason not to 
establish meaningful electoral politics at the heart of the European political process (Kumm 
2008: 135). More than “integration by stealth” (Majone), this is probably the essential dilemma 
                                                   
19  E.g., de Vries et al. (2010) report that the media and political parties have strong influence on the 
perception of electors of the issues presented to them : if they provide clear cues on where they stand on 
important aspects of European policy-making (and politics!) voters orient their own decision more on 
issues than on secondary considerations such as to sanction the national government. 
20  Two examples: At the end of 2010 German MEPs of the ALDE group spoke out in favor of the 
creation of Eurobonds, whereas these were (and still seem to be) anathema for the German government. 
Similarly, despite the French and German governments’ misgivings German members of the EPP group 
expressed themselves in favor of bringing Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area, i.e. to eliminate 
most border controls. 
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facing those who would like to see a more political EU. For instance, Moravcsik’s argument for 
doing nothing in the face of the weakness of EP elections to produce direct democratic input is 
effectively a call to revise the normative underpinnings of the separation of powers in the EU 
(Schleicher 2011). 
 
Even if there are no strong normative or empirical arguments to believe that the nation state is 
the final geographical and political destination of democratic legitimacy, there are no reasons 
either to hope that an EU demos is quietly “gathering strength and substance, ready to emerge 
fully-formed at an indeterminate date in the near future” (Donnelly/Jopp 2009: 34). Political 
identity has mostly been the result of sustained interaction between citizens and their political 
institutions. The role of incumbents and existing accountability structures can hardly be 
overestimated in this respect and rresistance to change can be explained by rational choice 
theories postulating that those who benefit from institutions already in place have strong 
incentives to use their institutional powers to veto proposals for changes (Rose/Bernhagen 
2010). More specifically, Mattias Kumm has convincingly argued that “infatuation with the sui 
generis character of the European Union […] has led to stigmatising the idea of a robust 
European parliamentarianism as a sign of intellectual inertia. The case against representative 
democracy in Europe may not be as strong as it seems and the costs of making do with without 
it may be very high” (Kumm 2008: 136). 
 
To present European governance as an inescapable trade-off between integration and 
democracy (pace Majone) ignores the fact that such a trade-off only appears when democracy is 
not “routinicized” (Magnette 2006; see also Schmitter’s point that it is necessary to “gradually 
build up expectations” for a successful politicization of the EU (2000: 45)). Having regular 
elections with critical debates on European policies and even referendums (possibly Europe-
wide) on constitutional questions on the future of the European Union could acquaint EU 
citizens to see themselves as part of a larger political entity. However, as this paper has tried to 
show, such an avenue seems only promising under quite restrictive conditions: careful design 
of political institutions at the European level and courageous innovations of the organisation of 
European politics. For instance, in a study for the European Parliament Bardi et al. (2010) 
conclude that a transnational constituency could foster closer party co-operation at EU level, by 
promoting genuine transnational campaigning and EU level party programs; furthermore, 
preferential voting, if implemented at EU level, could have a positive impact on the develop-
ment of political parties at the European level. 
 
Political leaders have so far resisted tampering with the ”rules of the game” of national politics. 
However, the disquiet in a number of member states about the impact of the EU on their 
national democracies, in addition to the growing stakes in integration may force Europe’s 
political leaders to be more innovative in their approach to the political fabric of integration 
(Laffan 1999: 84/85). Democracy rests on the premise that although perfection always proves 
impossible to reach, steps towards self-correction, innovation and improvement are still 
possible. 
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